Do bad bidders become good targets?

This adds to earlier evidence by Ghosh and Sirmans (2003), who partially explain the absence of hostile takeovers for REITs by the negative effects of larger insider shareholdings. This is the case because no incumbent target management team wants to be ignominiously thrown out of office in a hostile takeover. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 721–746. 3. Journal of Finance, 57, 695–720. American Sociological Review, 69: 433–457. 2006.

Other results of the analysis ranged from -.04 to .06. If either Abby or Samantha decides to sell her shares, the other will wind up as a minority shareholder in a poorly run company. Journal of Finance, 51: 111–136. This is probably due to the inclusion of European companies in our sample, which generally have a smaller size.

Journal of Finance, 60, 2859–2894. 1 The Fundamental Agency Problem and Its ....,,,$file/corpgov-guide_US.pdf,, ing%20standards%202004101204030137.pdf,$file/corpgovguide_US.pdf,,,,,,, Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton, 1998,'s/student%20handout/tactics/bo301.rtf,, Consequently, the shareholder remains “rationally ignorant” of what is going on. Finally, stock bids in non-REIT takeovers lead to insignificant wealth effects. Regarding this approach, there is no consensus in the literature to whether the inefficient management hypothesis holds (Agrawal and Jaffe 2003; Schleifer and Vishny 1986). In our detailed study on the functioning of the real estate takeover market, we will make a comparison between takeovers of REITs and takeovers of real estate companies without a REIT-status to investigate how the REIT structure affects the inefficient management hypothesis. volume 36, pages141–163(2008)Cite this article. Studying the abnormal returns to targets in more detail, we find that targets receiving a bid from a private firm receive higher abnormal returns in comparison to targets receiving a public bid.

The event period disturbance term can than be estimated by subtracting μ The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective, New York: Harper & Row. Financial characteristics of acquiring firms and their relation to the wealth effects of acquisition announcements. Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2004). Graham, J. R., Lemmon, M. L., & Wolf, J. G. (2002). Taking a closer look at the private bidders in Europe, we find a high number of management buyouts in the UK, which might be explained by the discounts to NAV that are frequently observed for UK listed property companies over the sample period (Brounen and ter Laak 2005). The economic theory of managerial capitalism, London: Macmillan. CARs in REIT takeovers financed with stock are quite similar to previous findings in the real estate literature, for example, Campbell et al. Only ten deals in our sample are cross-border. Unfortunately, bidders cannot avoid the reach of the Williams Act simply by not making a public bid or tender offer. Hitherto, several perspectives on wealth effects following takeovers have been studied in finance literature, thereby addressing specific issues such as method of payment (Franks et al. This would largely depend on the number of years (usually 3–5) since this person served as CEO. Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 121–139. Among some observers, the notion of agency theory and corporate governance are essentially equivalent (e.g., Dow & Raposo, 2005 Dow, J. and Raposo, C. C. 2005. The capital markets have been remarkably successful at generating sufficient capital to finance takeovers. Notably, Walsh and Kosnik (1993) Walsh, J. P. and Kosnik, R. D. 1993. market for corporate control is composed of individuals and firms that buy ownership positions in (or take over) potentially undervalued corporations so they can form new divisions in established diversified companies or merge two previously separate firms